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Introduction 
In the last few years, firms providing public utility services at the local level 
(LPU),  in  Italy  as  well  as  in  other  European  countries,  have  experienced 
structural  changes  in  governance  panels  and  corporate  makeups. 
Specifically, gradual privatization interventions have been triggered with the 
aim of building up a better mix between allocative efficiency and x-efficiency, 
with  respect  to  what  has  been  done  up  to  the  present  with  direct 
management  patterns  for  services  provided  by  local  bodies.  Apart  from 
constraints set by national standards, such processes are advisable from a 
theoretical point of view as they allow to achieve better conditions of general 
social welfare.   
 Actually, the concept of privatization is more complex that it seems to be. As 
a  consequence,  it  entails  several  articulated  choices.  An  example  of  the 
complexity of this issue can be given by the study of the Enìa S.p.A. case, a 
company that manages the local public utilities (LPU) of the Western area of 
the Emilia Romagna Region. Enìa S.p.A. was set up by the merging of three 
multi-utility companies (former city-owned firms).  
The  analysis  which  derives  from  this  study,  allows  to  focus  on  various 
aspects  related  to  privatization  processes  and  to  detect  some  specific 
features of local public utilities in Italy.  
 
LOCAL PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Local public utilities (LPU) provide private nature goods (such as electricity, 
water,  gas,  transportation,  etc.)  which  means  that  they  can  be  used   3 
individually, given conditions of rivalry and exclusion or of public nature but 
subject to congestion. LPU are characterised by specific features that render 
public intervention advisable. In particular, they are socially relevant1 goods, 
which production and exchange frequently involve externalities or conditions 
of natural monopoly (increasing returns), which reinforce the idea of market 
failure. The adjective ‘local’ refers to the geographic area where the goods are 
provided  and  it  tends  to  be  a  restricted  area  especially  in  relation  to  the 
organisation of services.  
Within the European field of experience (and specifically the Italian one), the 
organisation of LPU has been done mainly by assigning the management of 
the  service  to  a  public  firm  in  conditions  of  horizontally  and  vertically 
integrated legal monopoly. The development of this institutional model has 
been historically explained on the basis of the technology available, referable 
to  the  model  of  natural  monopoly  and  to  the  consequent  possibility  of 
market failure. 
The benefits of public firms are associated to institutional effectiveness and 
simplicity,  to  containment  of  transaction  and  contractual  administrative 
costs as well as to a guarantee of the actual totality of the service itself. In 
first place, costs are associated to inefficiency of the corporate structure and 
they emerge as a consequence of technological development which tend to 
reduce over the time, the “naturalness” of monopoly.  In second place, there 
are  disadvantages  related  to  allocative  inefficiency  and  X-inefficiency 
                                       
1  Social  relevance implies  totality  and  security  of  offer,  achievement  of  satisfying  quality 
standards and equal treatment for all consumers. This essentially means equal prices for all 
even when production costs are different. In some cases the offer is given by prices lower 
than production costs, so that cross-subsidizing are provided as well as the possibility of 
loss production.    4 
according  to  the    Leibenstein  -  Gravelle2  model  deriving  from  information 
asymmetry  problems  and  especially  from  the  regulator’s  (Public  body) 
inability in acknowledging technology, costs and actions carried out by the 
managing body.  In third place, there is also a low level of transparency of 
cross-subsidizing processes between users3. 
On  this  basis,  theory  has  evidenced  throughout  the  years  a  cost-benefit 
result of the traditional organisation model, that is on the overall negative. 
Therefore,  this  has  led  to  build  up  a  new  model  of  management  for  local 
public utilities based on a wider liberalisation of relevant industrial sectors. 
 
Advantages of Privatization and Selection of Institutional Model  
An efficient industrial structure is characterised by the following properties4: 
1)  each firm produces quantity q* corresponding to the minimum of total 
average costs AC(q) [production efficiency]; 
2)  the price p* is equal to the minimum value of the curve of total average 
costs AC(q*) [allocative efficiency]; 
3)  the  total  production  of  n  companies  is  equal  to  demand  at  market 
price: n·q*=D(p*) [industrial structure efficiency]. 
                                       
2  Leibenstein  was  the  first  to  introduce  the  theory  of  inefficiency  generated  by  non-
competition,  defining  it  as  X-inefficiency.  It  is  particularly  noticed  when  competition 
pressure is low because in such conditions, workers will tend to reduce their working effort 
due to conditions of contractual incompleteness, with the consequent discretionary power 
they can choose in providing an effort. C.f. Leibenstein (1987) and Leibenstein (1966). 
3 With reference to the recent theories of the “principal agent” and property rights,  it is 
reasoned that public property does not provide sufficient incentives to reach efficiency. The 
reasons for this are: the utility function of public management does not correspond to that 
of the principal (either if a political  contact or the elector); the manager does not have any 
direct interest in maximising profits and/or minimising costs, considering the fact that what 
remains after covering costs gives no advantages, since his remuneration is normally fixed; 
there  is  no  obligation  represented  by  the  financial  market,  which  allows  to  control  the 
managers’ work by lowering the price of shares generated by sales. Last of all, the public 
enterprise is also exempt from the last limit of inefficiency given by bankruptcy.  
4 Grillo and Polo (1997).   5 
In the case of complete information,  private production, regulated private 
production  and  public  production  are  equivalent  institutional  models  of 
economic  organisation  which  tend  to  reach  the  conditions  of  efficiency 
mentioned  above.5  However,  if  the  State  is  in  conditions  of  asymmetric 
information towards production units, such equivalence is not guaranteed in 
general terms. Nevertheless, in some conditions the so-called Fundamental 
Theorem  of  Privatization  of  Sappington  and  Stiglitz6,  can  be  applied 
according to which the total delegation of production decisions to a private 
firm is socially preferable. Actually, the objectives of efficiency (minimisation 
of  costs),  equity  and  rent  drawing  are  perfectly  guaranteed  by  private 
production  on  condition  that  the  mechanism  of  delegation  follows  some 
rules. Or that  n companies that are neutral to risk, that have symmetric 
information on technology, participate in a system of auctions to acquire the 
right to produce the good (service) taken into consideration. The firm that 
wins the auction is guaranteed a payment in the light of production that is 
exactly  equivalent  to  the  social  value  the  government  attributes  to  such 
production.  The  term  social  value  is  the  generic  meaning  that  includes 
considerations on distribution (discrimination of users) and the awareness of 
the existence of a marginal cost of public funds, due to distortions caused by 
the taxation of goods necessary to finance transfer.  
The demonstration of this can be drawn by the Loeb-Magat7 model together 
with the selection mechanism of the monopolist through auction8. 
                                       
5 For a demonstration, c.f. Sappington and Stiglitz (1987). 
6  Sappington  and  Stiglitz  (1987b),  and,  for  an  empirical  analysis,  J.  D’Sonza,  W.L. 
Megginson, R. Nash (2005). 
7 Loeb e Magat (1979). 
8 Baron (1989).   6 
Where  social  welfare  (W)  is  the  Principal’s  pay-off  P  (government,  local 
institution).  In  conditions  of  equilibrium,  W  =  S  +  U,  where  S  is  the  net 
surplus of the consumer and U the pay-off of the Agent A (firm providing the 
service). With A neutral to risk, we have:  
T q q p U + Θ − = ] ) ( [      
T q q p q v S − − = ) ( ) (  
where q is the service production, v(q) the function of consumer demand; p(q) 
the inverse function of demand ( ) ( ' ) ( q v q p = );  Θ the marginal (and average) 
cost of production  and that is, the technological parameter known to A and 
not  observed  by  P;  T  the  transfer  that  integrates  the  revenues  of  A; 
q q p ) ) ( ( Θ − = π  the firm’s net profit.  
Let’s now imagine an auction system where each Agent writes down a figure 
(equivalent to M) to participate in the acquisition of the delegation contract. 
Considering  M  a  reduction  operated  on  the  supply  price,  the  Agent  who 
offers a higher M will obviously win. According to the Privatization Theorem, 
we will have:  M q q p q v T − − = ) ( ) (  
Supposing that  [ ]
O
O Θ Θ ∈ Θ , , we can ideally arrange n companies according to 
their efficiency Θ and confer to each of them a theoretical rent equivalent to 
the  difference  between  the  net  social  surplus  generated  by  it  and  the  net 
social  surplus  generated  by  the  less  productive  one.  Without  a  selection 
mechanism, only in the case of a less productive firm there is no rent, that is 
0 ) ( = = Θ u U
O , whereas in all the other cases the firm has a positive rent. If 
we  figure  an  auction  system  with  the  function  of  firm  pay-off  and  the   7 
transfer T mentioned above, for a generic efficiency firm Θ we will have that 
: 
) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) )) ( ( ( ) ( Θ − Θ Θ − Θ = Θ + Θ Θ − Θ = Θ M q q v T q q p U  
As  each  firm  will  tend  to  maximise  the  function  U  with  respect  to  q,  the 
consequence  will  be  that  Θ = Θ)) ( (q p ,  which  means  that  the  condition  of 
allocative efficiency is satisfied. Furthermore: 
) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( Θ − Θ Θ − Θ = Θ M q q v U  that is   ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( Θ Θ − Θ = Θ + Θ q q v M U  that for  
O Θ = Θ  becomes: 
) ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( Θ + Θ = Θ Θ − Θ ≥ Θ Θ − Θ = Θ + Θ M U q q v q q v M U O O O O O  for any value 
of Θ. 
The theoretical rent is therefore maximum for the production firm with  O Θ , 
that is also the firm able to put in the envelope the highest M reduction to 
the extent of ending the rent itself. Thus:  
0 ) ( = Θ U   Θ ∀ , from which: 
) ( ) ( Θ ≥ Θ M M O   Θ ∀  
the most productive firm wins the auction as it has been able to offer the 
highest reduction. An extension of the model, the so-called standard model 
of  adverse  selection  of  Baron-Myerson9,  stresses  instead  the  trade-off 
between allocative efficiency and productive efficiency (x-efficiency). What is 
relevant in this extension is the inclusion of the distribution element in the 
function of social welfare W, according to which the representative consumer 
deserves  a  higher  level  of  protection  than  the  manager  of  the  production 
firm;  Furthermore,  the  transmission  of  resources  to  the  regulated  firm 
                                       
9 Baron and Myerson (1982).   8 
entails  a  cost  in  terms  of  efficiency,  due  to  the  distortion  of  taxation 
necessary  for  financing.  If  we  assume  the  function  of  the  Agent’s  utility 
unchanged and if we stress with  Φ the distribution element (being  1 < Φ ), 
the Principal’s function of pay-off will be:  
] ) ) ( [( ] ) ( ) ( [ T q q p T q q p q v U S W + Θ − Φ + − − = Φ + =  
or if we wish to include in the marginal cost of public funds (σ ), 
] ) ( [( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( T q q v U T q q p q v W σ σ − Θ − = + + − − =  
By applying the revelation principle, it is proved that from the maximisation 
of the Principal’s function of pay-off the following condition derives:10 
) )( 1 ( )) ( ( O q p Θ − Θ Φ − + Θ = Θ  
Such  solution  entails  that  the  need  to  boost  A  to  self-selection  (to  reach 
conditions of production efficiency) determines a cost in terms of allocative 
efficiency since  Θ > Θ)) ( (q p .  
 
The  models  provided  above  are  based  on  very  restrictive  assumptions  (in 
particular, the contractual completeness hypothesis). However, they allow to 
stress the utility of privatization processes on one side, and, on the other, to 
point out the eventual presence of a trade-off between allocative efficiency 
                                       
10  The  Principle  of  revelation  applied  to  the  model  under  examination  requires  that  P 
receives from  A    a  message  ^ Θ ,  thus fixing  the  contractual  terms  ) ^ (Θ q   and  ) ^ (Θ T . 
Taking only into consideration the contracts for which  Θ = Θ^ , the problem of P is that of 
defining the contractual terms so that: 
∫ Θ Θ ) ( ) ( dF W Max  observing the following binding conditions:  
1)  ) , ^ ( ) ( Θ Θ ≥ Θ U U     ^ ,Θ Θ ∀  (i.e. the truthful statement of the Agent is the 
dominating strategy); 
2)  0 ) ( ≥ Θ U        Θ ∀   (i.e. the truthful statement of the Agent fulfils his 
condition of individual rationality)    9 
and x-efficiency.11However, even in the case of contractual incompleteness, 
several authors have reached the conclusion that there are many significant 
circumstances in which it is convenient to attribute the property of public 
utility companies to private subjects: In particular, the aim of: 
•  decreasing on one side, the discretionary power of a public bureaucracy  
quite colluded with politicians12 and the political control of production13; 
•  increasing,  on  the  other  side,  the  regulator’s  reliability  with  the 
commitment  of  not  making  use  of  the results  of  investment  in  human 
capital  of  management14  for  “inappropriate”  purposes  and  of  fulfilling 
binding balance constraints15 provides meaningful examples in which it is 
convenient  to  start  privatization  processes even  in  the  presence  of  less 
restrictive conditions compared to the above mentioned models.  
In particular, the Schmidt model shows that privatization is less effective in 
sectors  characterised  by  high  fixed  costs  and  by  marginal  costs  that  are 
poorly affected by hidden information. According to the author, these are the 
sectors of wide services of public utility with a ‘network’ structure, such as 
the LPU. However, even the privatization of these sectors is advisable if the 
structure of costs is characterised by the prevailing weight of labour cost and 
if, the incentives for its containment – by limiting the exceeding number of 
                                       
11In  the  same  way,  we  can  detect  the  presence  of  trade-off  between  incentives  to 
production units (to the x-efficiency and to the allocative efficiency) and equity that can 
be reached by supplying public services. In particular, Laffont (Laffont, J.J., The Politics 
of  Government  Decision-making:  a  Theory  of  Regulatory  Capture,  Firenze,  Istituto 
Universitario  Europeo)  demonstrates  how  the  element  of  incentives  limits  the 
redistribution capacity of the adopted instrument. In other words, the need to define an 
optimal structure of prices from an efficiency point of view leads to a penalisation of the 
group  of  users we  want  to favour,  thus  generating  a  trade-off  between  incentive  and 
equity.  
12 Shapiro and Willig (1990) 
13 Boycko, Sheifer and Vishny (1996) 
14 Laffont and Tirole (1993).   10 
employees  and  by  being  rigorous  in  wages  -    are  decisive  for  the  firm’s 
actions.  In  conclusion, even  this  model  shows  the existence  of  a  trade-off 
between allocative efficiency, more easily reachable by the public firm and 
the x-efficiency that the private firm seems more suitable to obtain.  
 
Trends Today in Progress in Europe  
According to the above mentioned and assuming that privatization, meant as 
delegation to privates of LPU production results to be in several occasions an 
advisable process, it is undoubtedly useful to check which are the trends in 
progress in Europe.  With respect to this issue, it is worth mentioning that 
the LPU sector, is for its specific nature, linked to the evolution of standards. 
European  directives  on  single  LPU  and  respective  enforcing  national  
standards have indeed introduced different constraints for local authorities 
and consequently for former city-owned firms with the aim of liberalising the 
sector and building up competitive markets,  traditionally managed as local 
monopolies.  If  we  group  LPU  into  two  macro-classes  featuring  radically 
different competition and industrial logics between each other, the following 
trends can be pointed out within the European context:  
  Liberalised Businesses   Regulated Businesses  
 
Services / activities  • Importation/Production  of 
gas and electric energy 
• Sales  of  gas  and  electric 
energy 
• Distribution  of  gas  and 
electric energy 
• Integrated water cycle 
• Waste collection 
                                                                                                                         
15 Schmidt (1996)   11 
• Waste Disposal 
Sales features  The  sales  price  is  determined 
according to market logics 
The sales price is determined 
by  the  regulating  body 
and/or local body 
Critical factors of success  • Direct  management  of  final 
client 
• Competitiveness of sales offer 
• Supply  sources  raw 
materials/  low  production 
cost 
• Support of the local body of 
reference  (in  particular 
water and environment)  
• Operational (cost structure) 
and  management  efficiency 
(cost structure)  
• Rationalisation/ focusing of 
investments  
Market Dimension  • Businesses  managed  at 
national/international level 
• Tending to competition at the 
European level  
• “Closed”  systems  and 
businesses managed at the 
local level  
• Strong social significance  
Type of Operators  • Mainly  private  companies 
with  European 
level/relevance 
• State/Local Bodies 
• Local Operators or possibly, 
great  players  who  operate 
however  at  the  local  level 
essentially.  
 
THE ENÌA CASE 
We have briefly described some of the issues provided by economic theory to 
support privatization processes going on today in our country and in the rest 
of Europe.    12 
In order to find a concrete confirmation of the theoretical analysis carried 
out, a study of the firm Enìa S.p.A. has been carried out. In particular, the 
elements that are useful for its examination can be summarised as follows:  
-  the  company  was established  to  manage  LPU,  in  other  words  those 
services that were usually managed in the past in a system of public 
monopoly;  
-  between  the  local  participating  bodies  and  Enìa,  a typical  Principal-
Agent relationship was established, where the first has social welfare 
W as pay-off function, whereas the second aims at its own objectives of 
utility (firm profit function). This relationship was created in virtue of 
the  privatization  processes  previously  started  which  led  to  the 
establishment  of  the  company.  This  relationship  will  increase 
throughout  time  and  become  more evident  as witnessed  by  the  fact 
that  the  liberalisation  process  will  continue  and  include  private 
subjects in the capital;  
-  the  case  provided  stresses  also  some  of  the  typical  problems  of 
privatization  processes,  largely  evidenced  above,  and  in  particular, 
trade-off between efficiency objectives and social objectives and upkeep 
of  a  positive  rent  by  the  Agent.  Therefore,  the  growing  and  the 
willingness  of  the  LPU  privatization  processes  examined  on  the  one 
side by economic theory and on the other side by specific drives given 
by Community law as well as by the legislators of Member States, can 
be well represented by the Enìa S.p.A.  case. In order to provide the 
reasons for this transformation, below is provided a brief description of   13 
the operation which has led to the establishment of the company and 
an outline of the company from a theoretical point of view.  
Operation Description 
Enìa is a company that was born by merging TESA Piacenza, AMPS Parma 
and  AGAC  Reggio  Emilia.  It  is  a  “multi-utility”  company  that  shares  the 
experience  of  three  deeply  rooted  companies,  within  the  territory16.  It 
manages services that belong to the LPU category, i.e.: gas, energy, district 
heating, water cycle, waste disposal. The company’s organisation structure 
has a holding group, located in Parma, from which strategic, development, 
co-ordination  and  control  activities  are  managed  over  the  territory  of  the 
three provinces.  
The  “environment-network”  division  is  located  in  Reggio  Emilia.  Here, 
coordination activities concerning management of services over the territory 
are  carried  out  (gas  and  energy  distribution,  district  heating,  integrated 
water  cycle  and  environmental  cycle),  as  well  as  the  sales  division  which 
coordinates the sales networks of the territory, that is willing to join in one 
single  sales  company  for  energy  (gas  and  electricity)  in  the  future.  In 
Piacenza  the  design  and  management  division  is  headquartered.  It  is  in 
charge of centrally managing waste systems, cogeneration and production of 
electric energy. This division is also going towards a company structure, too. 
Three companies, 100% owned by public property still keep the property of 
the water cycle networks, held in the past by AGAC, AMPS and TESA . 
The organisational-company structure includes:  
                                       
16 Enìa, which user basin covers the province of Parma, Reggio Emilia and Piacenza, is the 
second Italian operator served per territory: 108 Municipalities for over 990,000 inhabitants.   14 
a.  guarantee of an adequate territorial control for the management and 
distribution  of  regulated  services  (distribution  of  electric  energy  and 
gas, water cycle management, waste collection);  
b.  unitary  management  of  liberalised  trade  activities  (sales  of  electric 
energy, gas and special waste disposal);  
c.  centralised management of the strategic purchase of gas and energetic 
trading;  
d.  centralised management of waste disposal systems, cogeneration and 
production of electric energy;  
e.  central  governing  of  orientation,  control,  strategic  planning  and 
support activities.   
According  to  these  principles,  the  built-up  organisational  macrostructure 
will include:  
•  an  industrial  holding  focused  on  activities  dealing  with:  strategy, 
orientation and development, co-ordination and monitoring;  
•  three  distinct  operational  divisions  with  competencies  on  management 
activities  dealing  with:  networks,  waste  collection  and  other  regulated 
and/or  local  activities,  design  and  management  of  systems,  marketing 
and trade activities;  
•  inside each division and for the different activities there will be:  
-  three  distinct  territorial  operational  companies  (SOT)  for  the 
management of technical services relevant to the distribution of gas 
and  electric  energy,  technical  management  of  district  heating, 
                                                                                                                         
The Emilia-Area Eco-utility counts more than 2,200 employees and in 2004, a turnover of 
over 880 million Euro and an Ebit amounting to 63 million Euro (7.3%).   15 
integrated water cycle management and environmental cycle (waste 
treatment excluded);  
-  a company for the management of waste disposal and cogeneration 
systems as well as for the design activities;  
-  a single sales company turning into the development of joint offers 
and energy services as well as the management of clients;  
-  forecasting  of  entrance  of  an  industrial  partner  in  the  “energy” 
sector (gas and electric energy) or quotation into the stock market if 
a suitable partner is not found. 
The Regulation Framing 
The  operation  provided  above  must  necessarily  be  considered  within  the 
scope of the latest Italian standard related to LPU. In particular, the Art. 113 
of the Law Decree 267/2000 (successive to the amendments introduced by 
the Law 448/2001 Finanziaria 2002) ” establishes that the “public bodies 
cannot  transfer  the  property  of  systems,  networks  and  other  equipment” 
meant  for  local  public  utilities  with  an  industrial  relevance.  The  only 
exception is given for the local bodies, also associated ones, that confer “the 
property of networks and other company equipment to capital companies of 
which they hold the majority, that cannot be transferred.17 With reference to 
the  LPU  with  industrial  relevance  the  forecast  is  to  create  a  precise 
                                       
17 In particular, Art. 25 of the Law 448/2001 has amended the discipline relevant to local 
public utilities, replacing Art. 113 of the Law Decree 267/2000. Among the main principles 
of the new standard we find the division of the property of systems, also headed by local 
bodies  –  directly  or  through  a  company  of  capitals  which  public  majority  cannot  be 
transferred - – the distribution of the service, activity to be carried by company of capitals 
selected  through  public  evidence  procedures.  The  subparagraph  8,  Art.  35  includes 
moreover, that the local bodies shall convert special companies and consortia that manage 
local  public  utilities  into  capital  companies.  These  companies  can  continue  distributing 
services under direct conferment until date of expiry and however, they cannot exceed the 
deadline of the provisional period established by the standards of the sector.    16 
distinction between the properties of networks and systems (that can belong 
to the local body or to a capital company with non-transferable majority), the 
management  of  networks  and  systems  (that  can  be  directly  assigned  to 
capital companies with majority shareholding of local bodies or – through 
public  evidence  procedure  –  to  other  companies)  and  the  supply  of  the 
service,  that will  have  to  be  carried  out  always  in  competition  conditions, 
with reference to capital companies selected upon auctions, which modalities 
are  regulated  by  law.  Therefore,  the  body  is  not  permitted  to  manage  the 
service directly: the body can only be entitled to hold the networks; for the 
management  of  networks,  the  setting  up  of  a  company  of  capitals  is 
necessary (although by keeping its public majority), unless the body decides 
to pass the work to external companies. It is therefore clear that the choices 
of governance that have been made are mainly determined by the standards 
in force.  
THEORETICAL FRAMING 
Privatization as a process of multi-dimensional choice  
The first part has focused on some fundamental theoretical concepts with 
the aim of proving the willingness of privatization processes of LPU. For this 
purpose, we have provided a schematic frame in which there is a trend going 
on  in  Europe  today  leading  to  the  abandoning  of  types  of  public 
management. Now, in order to outline the Enìa case, with reference also to 
the lawful elements we have mentioned, it is first of all necessary to provide 
a more suitable (and articulated) definition of the idea of privatization. This 
is not an unambiguous concept both for the fact that it features different   17 
nuances  and  also  because  it  might  concern  only  one  specific  part  of  the 
public service and not the entire system in its complexity.   
We  have  already  mentioned  the  alternative  supposition  of  authentic 
privatization  and  of  the  so-called  regulated  privatization.  If we extend  our 
analysis, most of all adapting it to the LPU case, the concept can take up the 
meaning of a gradual process of change of institutional forms through three 
different decision-making areas, i.e.18: 
a)  The selection of the organisation system in which a LPU is carried out 
(for example authority replaced by a limited company);  
b)  The assignment of the property (from the local government to private 
shareholders; 
c)  The extension of the regulations and competition.  
Selection of Organisational Context 
If we take into consideration the organisational context, two are the typical 
forms of governance that can be applied:  
Authority 
It is a sort of ‘orthodox’ type of privatization, in which LPU is however seen 
as a part of public administration, although with slightly different modalities 
compared  to  public  property.  It  consists  of  a  form  of  public  management 
which  includes  a  hierarchical  structure  with  a  minimum  number  of 
operators.  
In short,  it includes a legislative body that gives a sufficient discretionary 
power  to  the  executive  sector  to  handle  various  practical  situations 
                                       
18 C.f., among others, Weigel (2003).   18 
(individual cases, external condition changes). The executive sector manages 
offices and divisions and provides performance criteria.  
 
Formal Privatization 
LPU is carried out by a private company under public control. The adjective 
“formal” refers to the company’s property, still under public control and thus 
to the case in which production is not totally held by privates and conditions 
of competition are not often achieved. In a formal way, the centres of interest 
in  privatised  services  are  mainly  represented  by  the  legislator,  the 
representatives of the government, as owners (with the eventual presence of 
a private partner) from the management of the production unit to the clients.    19 
 
The models provided above represent two forms of gradual privatization. The 
first  has  a  simpler  structure  with  lower  transaction  costs,  whereas  the 
second  allows  a  more  accentuated  passage  from  public  to  private 
management. Both cases assume a more or less intense public intervention 
related to the need to guarantee a minimum level of allocative efficiency and 
distribution equity that would not be reached if the market was left to work 
according  to  its  own  rules.  As  we  are  talking  about  LPU,  as  we  have 
previously  outlined,  the  social  significance  of  services  supplied  renders  a 
corrective measure by the State advisable. Although the forms of governance 
described represent two cases of “new public management”, in the sense that 
it consists of two ideas of interventions by the public subject that are much 
more fluent than forms adopted in the past (public firm); the transition to 
one  of  these  forms  of  interventions  actually  represents  a  type  of 
privatizations.  
If we take into consideration the Italian scenario, LPU have been gradually 
evolved from a form of public management into a kind of formally privatised 
services.  In  particular,  considering  also  the  consequences  provided  by  the   20 
standard introduced by the already quoted Law 448/2001, the passages that 
have concerned LPU are outlined below:    21 
At  the  moment  Enìa  can  be  located  in  the  third  passage,  that  is  to  say 
among multi-service companies, with the presence of a company specifically 
set  up  to  manage  the  property  of  infrastructures  that  is  not  meant  to  be 
shared with private partners. It is clear that the passages provided above are 
strictly connected to the evolution of standards  as per the quoted Art. 35, 
Law 448/2001. In particular, the setting up of one (or more) companies for 
the management of services separated from company owner of the systems 
follows  a  specific  logic:  on  one  side,  it  allows  the  building  up  of  service 
privatization  processes  through  a  more  or  less  accentuated  entrance  of 
privates  into  multi-services, without    affecting,  on  the  other  side,  the  law 
obligation that prevents the public power from withdrawing the property of 
structures.  
Assignment of Property 
The  following  step  will  consist  in  finding  private  partners  for  the 
management of services with an economic relevance (i.e. services that can 
attract private investors19). 
This hypothesis has already been taken into consideration when building up 
the  Enìa  project,  with  the  idea  of  involving  an  already  existing  industrial 
partner,  with  specific  requirements,  or,  a  diffused  shareholding  unit 
guaranteed by the company’s taking part into the stock market. The latter 
possibility  is  more  likely  to  occur,  also  in  consideration  of  analogous 
attitudes held for LPU in other territories of Italy. On one side, the public 
                                       
19 LPU with economic relevance require that the beneficiaries pay for the service and the 
price paid allows to cover costs and recompense the invested capital. These are generally: 
water, environmental hygiene, chemist shops, public transportation, gas and electricity. In 
LPU without economic relevance local body sustains most of the costs for the service such 
as the people assistance services and green area services.    22 
company guarantees the entrance of new capitals and on the other side, it 
avoids the presence of an industrial partner that would inevitably put on (in 
a  more  o  less  restricted  way)  decisional  power  within  the  company.  
Furthermore,  the  current  situation  of  the  LPU  market,  previously 
characterised  by  public  monopoly,  does  not  see  the  presence  of  many 
operators,  especially  for  size  and  technical  skills,    that  can  represent 
potential  partners  for  Enìa.  The  condition  required  for  the  entrance  of 
privates under any sort of form, is that the Public Body keeps the majority of 
the social capital and reserves itself the right to appoint the majority of the 
members of the Board of Directors and the Board of Auditors. On one side, 
the logic of this choice lies in the exclusively political interest of local bodies 
in  controlling  multi-service  companies,  independently  from  substantial 
reasons, directly involving the users. On the other side, although, the control 
exercised by Enìa’s administration body is currently esteemed as the best 
instrument used by the Principal (i.e. the owning local bodies) to maximise 
the result of the Agent (multi-service company) under every point of view. 
The fundamental problem is thus the lack of an alternative system of control 
able  to  verify  the  correspondence  between  the  political  orientations 
expressed by the local bodies. The need to “own the companies” to guarantee 
citizens with traditional services can indeed be avoided only with a modern 
and  efficient  regulation  system  different  from  the  idea  of  property.  It  is 
important to stress that the possibility of an entrance of private partners was 
taken  into  consideration  only  for  the  “energy”  sector,  given  the  industrial 
importance  of  the  sector  itself.  Indeed,  it  is  inside  the  sector  of  electric 
energy and gas where a stronger competition will be developed, especially in   23 
perspective.  Such  competition  will  undoubtedly  require  strong  investment 
operations and consequently more capital resources.  Growth becomes an 
essential condition to “stay in the market”. Other sectors instead, (such as 
environment  and  water)  will  stay  away,  for  many  points  of  view,  from 
competition phenomena over a short/medium period. 
 
 Extension of Competition 
The extension of competition is fundamental also for LPU in order to avoid 
that the former city-owned firm takes out an excessive rent. The advantages 
related to the entrance of a second operator, at least, can be simplified as 
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in other words to render null the rent of both firms. The table given above is 
purely theoretic. However, it gives an idea on how important the entrance of 
other firms (besides the only city-owned firm) is to reduce rents taken from 
consumers. In order to specifically check the actual extension of competition   24 
within the management of LPU managed by Enìa, it is necessary to break 
down the production processes carried out by the company. In particular, 
the supply of goods can be divided into the following steps (or phases) : 
•  direction and coordination; 
•  network management; 
•  raw material supply (inputs); 
•  actual production; 
•  sales and trade activities;  
•  supply and distribution21. 
The  benefit  of  the  breaking  down  these  points  lies  in  the  possibility  of 
detecting the difference between the various phases of service supply, which 
can  be  subject  to  autonomous  forms  of  privatization  with  respect  to  the 
others.  
The chart that follows gives the division of LPU products by Enìa, showing 
the level of liberalisation experienced for the phases of each service.  
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20 It consists of a Bertrandian paradigm, see: Grillo and Polo (1997). 
21 According to Weigel (2003), if we consider the various production phases, the privatization 
process can be detected within the following matrix:  
  organisational form  Property  Competitiveness  
initial financing       
raw material supply       
Production       
Offer of finished product        
   25 
Production  Regulated  liberalised  liberalised  Regulated 
Sales and trade 
activities  Liberalised 
Supply  and 
distribution  Liberalised 
 
As you can see,  from a formal point of view, privatization has involved all 
the LPU in their complexity; from a substantial point of view a real form of 
liberalisation  (meant  as  the  elimination  of  barriers  at  entrance  of  other 
operators, besides the impending one) has occurred in a different way for the 
various  services  and  for  the  phases  they  are  made  up  of.  The  activity  of 
direction and coordination is still be carried out by the public also in virtue 
of the social relevance of LPU, that obliges the public body to keep a role of 
political orientation and coordination. Such structure noticeably shows the 
separation  between  the  local  body  on  one  side,  covering  the  role  of  the 
Principal,  and  the  company  of  services  on  the  other,  covering  the  role  of 
Agent. The first gives to the second the task of producing and distributing a 
good. However, the difference in terms of pay-off function between the two 
operators  stresses  all  the  issues  characterising  an  agency  relationship  (in 
particular,  the  existence  of  asymmetric  information  and  the  possibility  of 
collusive phenomena) in a more distinctive way than what occurs in a public 
firm, with a higher level of dependency between government and company. 
The property of the infrastructures is also kept 100% by the same body as 
per  lawful  obligations.  Furthermore,  a  liberalisation  not  only  formal,  has 
occurred  especially  in  “energy”  type  services  (gas  and  electric  energy). 
Besides distribution, trade and sales, in these sectors even production can 
be made by subjects other than Enìa. A more limited approach to the market   26 
is witnessed in water and environment services even if there seems to be an 
increasing involvement of privates in this sector.  
Critical Elements 
The process of liberalisation described above and similarly started in many 
other Italian areas, outlines the new role covered by local governing bodies 
with regards to LPU. In addition to undeniable advantages (enhancement of 
production efficiency, abandoning of unjustified forms of public monopoly, 
reduction  of  bureaucracy  within  service  management,  etc.)  the  created 
organisational  context  has  evidenced  some  critical  aspects,  related  to  the 
position taken on by the local body as well as to the actual functioning of 
competition mechanisms. The first aspect, points out that a more distinct 
separation  between  the  function  of  LPU  management  and  the  action  of 
monitoring  carried  out  by  local  bodies  generates  the  risk  of  causing  
problems of “political” correspondence concerning the work carried out by 
the  S.p.a.    with  reference  to  the  social  orientation  elements  provided.  In 
other words, there could be an accentuation of the already mentioned trade-
off between efficiency, on one side, and elements of social and redistribution 
evaluation on the other. This phenomenon is likely to become more visible 
when,  as  a  consequence  to  the  entering  of  private  subjects  and  the 
liberalisation of the market, privatization will become substantial rather than 
formal,  thus  rendering  urgent  the  need  to  guarantee  a  major  competition 
efficiency.  Furthermore,  the  moving  away  of  the  public  body  from  the 
company managed by LPU may cause a growing formalization of relationship 
between the two subjects. This could lead to a difficulty in handling service 
contract, call for tenders, etc. In fact, the system that has been generated,   27 
which  is  a  third  system  with  reference  to  the  relationship  local  body-
company,  requires  to  develop  new  regulation  instruments,  with  the 
consequent growth of transaction costs. Many future circumstances are not 
predictable,  especially  social  and  redistribution  ones,  because  they  are 
variegated  and  continuously  changing.  Therefore,  agreements  signed  in 
medium and long terms are subject to continuous negotiation. Other critical 
elements can then be evidenced with regard to the actual economic benefits 
on citizens-users. As a matter of fact, a concentrated structural offer in the 
hands  of  a  little  number  of  operators,  with  the  presence  of  a  dominating 
operator (Enìa). This situation has allowed this subject to achieve a positive 
rent, determined not only by improving efficiency and reducing costs, but 
also  by  applying  higher  tariffs  than  those  normally  allowed  in  more 
competitive  market  conditions.  The  expected  competition  between 
‘managers’, which represents the condition to assure a substantial recovery 
of productivity and reduction of tariffs to the advantage of the user, does not 
seem to have reached the desired levels, at least until now. The risk now is 
that  the  local  bodies  place  fund  needs beforehand, thus  avoiding,  on  one 
side, to make a real transfer to privates, and on the other, to maximise rents, 
to the detriment of long-term perspectives. The problems that will have to be 
faced  are  significant  and  cannot  be  exhausted  in  the  issues  mentioned 
above. For  example,  other  issues  are  generated  by  rents  from  the  agent’s 
informative  monopoly,  from  the  risk  of  collusive  phenomena,  from  the 
difficulty in evaluating the performances of the multi-service companies, etc.  
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Conclusions 
According to the considerations provided, some conclusions concerning both 
the Enìa case and the context of LPU privatization processes can be drawn. 
First of all, it can be observed on one side, that if economic theory aims at 
improving the efficiency of the industrial pattern, it also suggests getting rid 
of the forms of public management of these services; on the other side, the 
recent  lawful  outcomes  have  provided  a  significant  contribution  (but  also 
substantial  changes)  to  the  deep  modifications  that  several  local  realities 
have  experienced.  The  reforms  carried  out  must  be  considered  as  partial 
reforms, in the meaning that they are only part of the process that has not 
yet  finished,  that  should  lead  to  more  substantial  forms  of  privatization 
compared to the present ones.  
In such context, Enìa S.p.A. is symbolical of the changes occurred in the way 
of  managing  LPU.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  consists  of  a  typical  example  of 
formal privatizations, that is made by setting up a private company (limited 
company), but entirely owned by the local body. The next step which is the 
entrance  of  private  partners,  perhaps  under  the  shape  of  a  spread 
shareholding unit, will certainly determine a stronger spur towards a more 
substantial  privatization,  even  though  the  control  of  the  company  will 
necessarily remain in the hands of the public body. The latter will indeed 
keep  the  majority  of  components  of  administration  and  surveillance.  In 
addition to the issues related to governance and to the property structure of 
Enìa, it is worth mentioning that for some types of services, privatization has 
coincided with the opening up to forms of liberalisation of the intervention 
market. In particular, this phenomenon has involved the ‘energy’ sector (gas   29 
and  electric  energy),  whereas  for  other  sectors,  such  as  environment  and 
water  cycle,  we  are  still  far  from  building  up  more  competitive  contexts, 
although it has been noticed that that the context has become less closed 
than some years ago. To sum up, the process that has been implemented up 
to now has allowed to improve productivity standards thus creating suitable 
conditions for the  former city-owned firm to “stay in the market”, thanks 
also to a reduced economic vulnerability and within the perspective of finally 
reaching  a  higher  level  of  common  welfare.  This  aim  has  been  partially 
reached until now. On one side, there are news problems, mainly related to 
the potential trade-off between efficiency and objectives of social nature (not 
only price of services but also quality and security) and on the other side, 
low levels of real competition in LPU have not allowed an adequate reduction 
of tariffs, thus enabling the dominating operator to carry on  maintaining an 
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